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Molyneux’s Question in Berkeley’s Theory of Vision

Loaiza, Juan R. (2017) Molyneux’s Question in Berkeley’s Theory of Vision. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 32 (2). pp. 231-247. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

I propose a reading of Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision in which Molyneux-type questions as thought experiments instead of arguments. First, I present the general argumentative strategy in the NTV, and provide grounds for the traditional reading. Second, I consider some roles of thought experiments, and classify Molyneux-type questions in the NTV as constructive conjectural thought experiments. Third, I argue that (i) there is no distinction between Weak and Strong Heterogeneity theses in the NTV; (ii) that Strong Heterogeneity is the basis of Berkeley's theory; and (iii) that Molyneux-type questions act as illustrations of Strong Heterogeneity.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Loaiza, Juan R.loaiza.juan@hu-berlin.de
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Berkeley, Molyneux's question, Heterogeneity, thought experiments, perception
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 20 Jun 2017 14:18
Last Modified: 20 Jun 2017 14:18
Item ID: 13135
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/v...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.15984
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: May 2017
Page Range: pp. 231-247
Volume: 32
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13135

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