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Causal Explanatory Power

Eva, Benjamin and Stern, Reuben (2017) Causal Explanatory Power. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Schupbach and Sprenger (2011) introduce a novel probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general approach, we argue that it does not (without revision) adequately capture the way in which the causal explanatory power that c exerts on e varies with background knowledge. We then amend their approach so that it does capture this variance. Though our account of explanatory power is less ambitious than Schupbach and Sprenger's in the sense that it is limited to causal explanatory power, it is also more ambitious because we do not limit its domain to cases where c genuinely explains e. Instead, we claim that c causally explains e if and only if our account says that c explains e with some positive amount of causal explanatory power.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Eva, Benjaminbenedgareva@icloud.com
Stern, Reubenreuben.stern@gmail.com
Keywords: Formal Epistemology, Causation, Explanation, Explanatory Power
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User: Dr Benjamin Eva
Date Deposited: 12 Aug 2017 14:15
Last Modified: 12 Aug 2017 14:15
Item ID: 13322
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Date: 11 August 2017
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13322

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