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Conditional Degree of Belief

Sprenger, Jan (2017) Conditional Degree of Belief. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper articulates and defends a suppositional interpretation of conditional degree of belief. First, I focus on a type of probability that has a crucial role in Bayesian inference: conditional degrees of belief in an observation, given a statistical hypothesis. The suppositional analysis explains, unlike other accounts, why these degrees of belief track the corresponding probability density functions. Then, I extend the suppositional analysis and argue that all probabilities in Bayesian inference should be understood suppositionally and model-relative. This sheds a new and illuminating light on chance-credence coordination principles, the relationship between Bayesian models and their target system, and the epistemic significance of Bayes' Theorem.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Sprenger, Janj.sprenger@uvt.nl0000-0003-0083-9685
Keywords: conditional probability, degree of belief, statistical inference, Principal Principle, Ramsey
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Jan Sprenger
Date Deposited: 06 Oct 2017 05:06
Last Modified: 06 Oct 2017 05:06
Item ID: 13515
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 5 October 2017
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13515

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