Muller, F.A. (2003) In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Metaphpysics versus Science. UNSPECIFIED. (In Press)

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Abstract

A defence of constructive empiricism against an attack of N. Maxwell by means of his pet-thesis that science implicitly and permanently accepts a metaphysical thesis about the nature of the universe. We argue that Maxwell's attack can be beaten off; that his arguments do not establish what Maxwell believes they establish; and that we can draw a number of valuable lessons from these attacks about the nature of science and of the libertatian nature of constructive empiricism.

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Item Type:	Other
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Muller, F.A.
Additional Information:	-
Keywords:	constructive empiricism, metaphysical realism
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	F.A. Muller
Date Deposited:	05 Sep 2003
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:12
Item ID:	1371
Public Domain:	Yes
Commentary on:	-
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	August 2003
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1371

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