Nguyen, James (2016) On the Pragmatic Equivalence between Representing Data and Phenomena. Philosophy of Science, 83 (2). pp. 171-191.

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Abstract

Van Fraassen argues that data provide the target-end structures required by structuralist accounts of scientific representation. But models represent phenomena not data. Van Fraassen agrees but argues that there is no pragmatic difference between taking a scientific model to accurately represent a physical system and accurately represent data extracted from it. In this article I reconstruct his argument and show that it turns on the false premise that the pragmatic content of acts of representation include doxastic commitments.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Nguyen, James j.nguyen1@lse.ac.uk
Keywords:	Models, representation, data, van Fraassen
Subjects:	General Issues > Data General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User:	James Nguyen
Date Deposited:	05 Dec 2017 18:31
Last Modified:	05 Dec 2017 18:31
Item ID:	14170
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy of Science
Official URL:	http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/...
DOI or Unique Handle:	https://doi.org/10.1086/684959
Subjects:	General Issues > Data General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date:	April 2016
Page Range:	pp. 171-191
Volume:	83
Number:	2
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14170

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