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The Domain of the Mental in Williamson’s Philosophy

Pérez Otero, Manuel (2018) The Domain of the Mental in Williamson’s Philosophy. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 33 (1). pp. 23-40. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

For Williamson, knowing and believing are mental states, but believing truly and justifiedly-and-truly believing are non-mental states. This discriminatory approach is relevant to his epistemology: his main negative epistemological thesis (on the alleged impossibility of defining knowledge in accordance with a traditional scheme) and his main positive epistemological thesis (his own alternative definition of knowledge) depend on his metaphysical theory about the demarcation of the mental. I present here a problem for Williamson’s theory of the mental: it imposes implausible restrictions on possible uses of concepts and linguistic expressions. I will describe some options that Williamson would have at his disposal to evade the problem; but I maintain that these options carry some degree of arbitrariness.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Pérez Otero, Manuelperez.otero@ub.edu
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: definitions of knowledge; true belief; mental concepts; factive states; conjunctive concepts
Subjects: General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 14 Mar 2018 21:23
Last Modified: 14 Mar 2018 21:23
Item ID: 14464
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/v...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.17629
Subjects: General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date: January 2018
Page Range: pp. 23-40
Volume: 33
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14464

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