Sample, Matthew S. (2015) Stanford’s Unconceived Alternatives from the Perspective of Epistemic Obligations. Philosophy of Science, 82 (5). pp. 856-866.
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Abstract
Kyle Stanford's reformulation of the problem of underdetermination has the potential to highlight the epistemic obligations of scientists. Stanford, however, presents the phenomenon of unconceived alternatives as a problem for realists, despite critics' insistence that we have contextual explanations for scientists' failure to conceive of their successors' theories. I propose that responsibilist epistemology and the concept of “role oughts,” as discussed by Lorraine Code and Richard Feldman, can pacify Stanford's critics and reveal broader relevance of the “new induction.” The possibility of unconceived alternatives pushes us to question our contemporary expectation for scientists to reason outside of their historical moment.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Keywords: | underdetermination, unconceived alternatives,epistemic obligation, realism | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Values In Science |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Matthew Sample | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 22 Mar 2018 19:58 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 22 Mar 2018 19:58 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 14488 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Philosophy of Science | ||||||
| Publisher: | University of Chicago | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/... | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1086/683324 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Values In Science |
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| Date: | December 2015 | ||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 856-866 | ||||||
| Volume: | 82 | ||||||
| Number: | 5 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14488 |
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