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Stanford’s Unconceived Alternatives from the Perspective of Epistemic Obligations

Sample, Matthew S. (2015) Stanford’s Unconceived Alternatives from the Perspective of Epistemic Obligations. Philosophy of Science, 82 (5). pp. 856-866.

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Abstract

Kyle Stanford's reformulation of the problem of underdetermination has the potential to highlight the epistemic obligations of scientists. Stanford, however, presents the phenomenon of unconceived alternatives as a problem for realists, despite critics' insistence that we have contextual explanations for scientists' failure to conceive of their successors' theories. I propose that responsibilist epistemology and the concept of “role oughts,” as discussed by Lorraine Code and Richard Feldman, can pacify Stanford's critics and reveal broader relevance of the “new induction.” The possibility of unconceived alternatives pushes us to question our contemporary expectation for scientists to reason outside of their historical moment.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Sample, Matthew S.0000-0001-5290-1458
Keywords: underdetermination, unconceived alternatives,epistemic obligation, realism
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Dr. Matthew Sample
Date Deposited: 22 Mar 2018 19:58
Last Modified: 22 Mar 2018 19:58
Item ID: 14488
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophy of Science
Publisher: University of Chicago
Official URL: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1086/683324
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: December 2015
Page Range: pp. 856-866
Volume: 82
Number: 5
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14488

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