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The Representational Semantic Conception

Suárez, Mauricio and Pero, Francesca (2018) The Representational Semantic Conception. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper argues for a representational semantic conception (RSC) of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely that theories can be characterised as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of ‘models’ and ‘structures’, which we reject. The practice-turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modelling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse representational practices in the sciences. These insights are applied to some mathematical models, thus showing that the mathematical sciences are not in principle counterexamples to RSC.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Suárez, Mauriciomsuarez@filos.ucm.es
Pero, Francescafrancesca.pero@unifi.it
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science
Keywords: Semantic Conception; Structuralism; Modeling; Idealization; Practice
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Prof Mauricio Suárez
Date Deposited: 13 Aug 2018 04:33
Last Modified: 13 Aug 2018 04:33
Item ID: 14927
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: August 2018
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14927

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