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Difference-splitting and the Equal Weight View

McCutcheon, Randall G. (2018) Difference-splitting and the Equal Weight View. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Dawid, DeGroot and Mortera showed, a quarter century ago, that any agent who regards a fellow agent as a peer--in particular, defers to the fellow
agent's prior credences in the same way that she defers to her own--and updates by split-the-difference is prone (on pain of triviality) to diachronic incoherence. On the other hand one may show that there are special scenarios in which Bayesian updating approximates difference splitting, so it remains an important question whether it remains a viable (approximate) response to ``generic" peer update. We look at arguments by two teams of philosophers (Fitelson $\&$ Jehle and Nissan-Rozen $\&$ Spectre) against difference splitting.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
McCutcheon, Randall G.cutch17@yahoo.com0000-0002-5305-3662
Keywords: Peer Disagreement, Reflection, Conditionalization
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Dr. Randall G. McCutcheon
Date Deposited: 11 Oct 2018 17:24
Last Modified: 11 Oct 2018 17:24
Item ID: 15138
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 10 October 2018
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15138

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