McCutcheon, Randall G.
(2018)
On Difference-splitting and the Equal Weight View.
[Preprint]
Abstract
Dawid, DeGroot and Mortera showed, a quarter century ago, that any agent who regards a fellow agent as a peer--in particular, defers to the fellow agent's prior credences in the same way that she defers to her own--and updates by split-the-difference is prone (on pain of triviality) to diachronic incoherence. On the other hand one may show that there are special scenarios in which Bayesian updating approximates difference splitting, so it remains an important question whether it remains a viable (approximate) response to ``generic" peer update. We critique arguments by two teams of philosophers (Fitelson & Jehle and Nissan-Rozen & Spectre) against this updating scheme, then suggest an alternative ``Equal Weight'' response to cases of peer disagreement.
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