Fazekas, Peter and Kertesz, Gergely (2018) Are higher mechanistic levels causally autonomous? In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

This paper provides a detailed analysis and explores the prospects of the arguments for higher-level causal autonomy available for the proponents of the mechanistic framework. Three different arguments (a context- based, an organisation-based, and a constraint-based) are distinguished. After clarifying previously raised worries with regard to the first two arguments, the paper focuses on the newest version of the third argument that has recently been revived by William Bechtel. By using Bechtel’s own case study, it is shown that not even reference to constraints can establish the causal autonomy of higher mechanistic levels.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Fazekas, Peter fazekas.peter@gmail.com Kertesz, Gergely rumcais@gmail.com
Keywords:	Mechanistic explanation; causal closure; causal autonomy; higher levels
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User:	Dr. Peter Fazekas
Date Deposited:	02 Nov 2018 01:16
Last Modified:	02 Nov 2018 01:16
Item ID:	15241
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date:	2018
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15241

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