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Against Mathematical Convenientism

Park, Seungbae (2016) Against Mathematical Convenientism.

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Abstract

Indispensablists argue that when our belief system conflicts with our experiences, we can negate a mathematical belief but we do not because if we do, we would have to make an excessive revision of our belief system. Thus, we retain a mathematical belief not because we have good evidence for it but because it is convenient to do so. I call this view ‘mathematical convenientism.’ I argue that mathematical convenientism commits the consequential fallacy and that it demolishes the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument and Baker’s enhanced indispensability argument.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Park, Seungbae
Keywords: Mathematical Confirmationism, Mathematical Convenientism, Indispensability Argument, Mathematical Realism
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Depositing User: Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited: 21 Jan 2019 01:09
Last Modified: 21 Jan 2019 01:09
Item ID: 15618
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Date: 2016
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15618

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