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Scientific Antirealists Have Set Fire to Their Own Houses

Park, Seungbae (2017) Scientific Antirealists Have Set Fire to Their Own Houses.

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Abstract

Scientific antirealists run the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism. I argue that the argument from underconsideration backfires on antirealists’ positive philosophical theories, such as the contextual theory of explanation (van Fraassen, 1980), the English model of rationality (van Fraassen, 1989), the evolutionary explanation of the success of science (Wray, 2008; 2012), and explanatory idealism (Khalifa, 2013). Antirealists strengthen the argument from underconsideration with the pessimistic induction against current scientific theories. In response, I construct a pessimistic induction against antirealists that since antirealists generated problematic philosophical theories in the past, they must be generating problematic philosophical theories now.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Park, Seungbae
Keywords: Argument from Underconsideration, Epistemic Privilege, Pessimistic Inductions
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited: 23 Jan 2019 15:12
Last Modified: 23 Jan 2019 15:12
Item ID: 15625
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2017
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15625

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