Martínez, Manolo (2019) Deception as Cooperation. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with `functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Martínez, Manolo mail@manolomartinez.net 0000-0002-6194-7121
Keywords:	deception; rate-distortion; information; signaling games; Skyrms; Shannon
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Computation/Information
Depositing User:	Dr. Manolo Martínez
Date Deposited:	25 Mar 2019 15:44
Last Modified:	25 Mar 2019 15:44
Item ID:	15845
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Computation/Information
Date:	24 March 2019
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15845

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• Deception as Cooperation. (deposited 27 Oct 2018 14:23)
  • Deception as Cooperation. (deposited 25 Mar 2019 15:44) [Currently Displayed]

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