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No Problem: Evidence that the Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness is Not Widespread

Sytsma, Justin and Ozdemir, Eyuphan (2019) No Problem: Evidence that the Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness is Not Widespread. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The meta-problem is “the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness” (Chalmers 2018, 6). This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. We challenge the breadth of this “we," arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. We then add to this body of evidence, presenting the results of a new cross-cultural study extending the work of Sytsma and Machery (2010).


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Sytsma, Justin
Ozdemir, Eyuphan
Additional Information: For or a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies on David Chalmers’s “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness” edited by François Kammerer.
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Depositing User: Justin Sytsma
Date Deposited: 21 May 2019 13:37
Last Modified: 21 May 2019 13:37
Item ID: 16030
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Date: 20 May 2019
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16030

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