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Can Multiple Realisation Be Explained?

Franklin, Alexander (2019) Can Multiple Realisation Be Explained? [Preprint]

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Abstract

Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phenomena despite their different underlying properties? In this paper I develop a framework for addressing that question and argue that multiple realisation can be reductively explained. I defend this position by applying the framework to a simple example – the multiple realisation of electrical conductors. I go on to compare my position to views advocated in Polger & Shapiro (2016), Batterman (2018), and Sober (1999). Contra these respective authors I claim that multiple realisation is commonplace, that it can be explained, but that it requires a sui generis reductive explanatory strategy. As such, multiple realisation poses a non-trivial challenge to reduction which can, nonetheless, be met.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Franklin, Alexanderalexrfranklin@gmail.com0000-0001-6034-4575
Keywords: Multiple realizability, multiple realization, autonomy, emergence, reduction
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User: Dr Alexander Franklin
Date Deposited: 13 Jul 2019 15:04
Last Modified: 13 Jul 2019 15:04
Item ID: 16215
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date: 12 July 2019
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16215

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