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Beyond the Instinct-Inference Dichotomy: A Unified Interpretation of Peirce’s Theory of Abduction

Mohammadian, Mousa (2019) Beyond the Instinct-Inference Dichotomy: A Unified Interpretation of Peirce’s Theory of Abduction. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I examine and resolve an exegetical dichotomy between two main interpretations of Peirce’s theory of abduction, namely, the Generative Interpretation and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation. According to the former, abduction is the instinctive process of generating explanatory hypotheses through a mental faculty called insight. According to the latter, abduction is a rule-governed procedure for determining the relative pursuitworthiness of available hypotheses and adopting the worthiest one for further investigation—such as empirical tests—based on economic considerations. It is shown that the Generative Interpretation is inconsistent with a fundamental fact of logic for Peirce—i.e., abduction is a kind of inference—and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation is flawed and inconsistent with Peirce’s naturalistic explanation for the possibility of science and his view about the limitations of classical scientific method. Changing the exegetical locus classicus from the logical form of abduction to insight and economy of research, I argue for the Unified Interpretation according to which abduction includes both instinctive hypotheses-generation and rule-governed hypotheses-ranking. I show that the Unified Interpretation is immune to the objections raised successfully against the Generative and the Pursuitworthiness interpretations.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Mohammadian, Mousammohamma@nd.edu0000-0002-2422-4979
Keywords: Abduction, Insight, Economy of Research, Explanation, Instinct, Inference, Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry
Subjects: General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User: Mousa Mohammadian
Date Deposited: 21 Jul 2019 13:43
Last Modified: 21 Jul 2019 13:43
Item ID: 16247
Subjects: General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date: 2019
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16247

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