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Are thought experiments “disturbing”? The case of armchair physics

Schindler, Samuel and Saint-Germier, Pierre (2019) Are thought experiments “disturbing”? The case of armchair physics. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Proponents of the “negative program” in experimental philosophy have argued that judgements in philosophical cases, also known as case judgements, are unreliable and that the method of cases should be either strongly constrained or even given up. Here we put one of the main proponent’s account of why philosophical cases may cause the unreliability of case judgements to the test. We conducted our test with thought experiments from physics, which exhibit the exact same supposedly “disturbing characteristics” of philosophical cases.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Schindler, Samuelsamuel.schindler@css.au.dk0000-0002-5656-9840
Saint-Germier, Pierre
Additional Information: forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
Keywords: thought experiments, armchair physics, Machery, the method of cases
Subjects: General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Samuel Schindler
Date Deposited: 23 Jul 2019 04:18
Last Modified: 23 Jul 2019 12:30
Item ID: 16249
Subjects: General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 2019
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16249

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