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Nonrational Belief Paradoxes as Byzantine Failures

Miller, Ryan (2019) Nonrational Belief Paradoxes as Byzantine Failures. [Preprint]

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Abstract

David Christensen and others argue that Dutch Strategies are more like peer disagreements than Dutch Books, and should not count against agents’ conformity to ideal rationality. I review these arguments, then show that Dutch Books, Dutch Strategies, and peer disagreements are only possible in the case of what computer scientists call Byzantine Failures—uncorrected Byzantine Faults which update arbitrary values. Yet such Byzantine Failures make agents equally vulnerable to all three kinds of epistemic inconsistencies, so there is no principled basis for claiming that only avoidance of true Dutch Books characterizes ideally rational agents. Agents without Byzantine Failures can be ideally rational in a very strong sense, but are not normative for humans. Bounded rationality in the presence of Byzantine Faults remains an unsolved problem.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Miller, Ryan66millerr@cua.edu0000-0003-0268-2570
Keywords: Byzantine General, Dutch Strategy, Ideal Rationality
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Computer Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Ryan Miller
Date Deposited: 16 Aug 2019 12:01
Last Modified: 16 Aug 2019 12:01
Item ID: 16337
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Computer Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 2019
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16337

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