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The Brain's "New" Science: Psychology, Neurophysiology, and Constraint

Hatfield, Gary (2000) The Brain's "New" Science: Psychology, Neurophysiology, and Constraint. Philosophy of Science, 67 (Suppl). S388-S403. ISSN 0031-8248

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Abstract

There is a strong philosophical intuition that direct study of the brain can and will constrain the development of psychological theory. When this intuition is tested against case studies on the neurophysiology and psychology of perception and memory, it turns out that psychology has led the way toward knowledge of neurophysiology. An abstract argument is developed to show that psychology can and must lead the way in neuroscientific study of mental function. The opposing intuition is based on mainly weak arguments about the fundamentality or objectivity of physics or physiology in relation to psychology.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Hatfield, Garyhatfield@sas.upenn.edu0000-0003-0876-7073
Keywords: Brain; Function; Neuroscience; Psychology; Stereopsis and disparity detectors; Neuropsychology; Patient HM; Opponent-process color theory; Churchland, P S
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User: Prof. Gary Hatfield
Date Deposited: 25 Aug 2019 01:54
Last Modified: 25 Aug 2019 01:54
Item ID: 16364
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophy of Science
Publisher: Philosophy of Science Association
Official URL: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/...
DOI or Unique Handle: doi.org/10.1086/392833
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date: September 2000
Page Range: S388-S403
Volume: 67
Number: Suppl
ISSN: 0031-8248
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16364

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