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Explaining Temporal Qualia

Farr, Matt (2019) Explaining Temporal Qualia. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims and make the case that passage-talk plays no useful explanatory role with respect to temporal qualia, but rather obfuscates what the philosophical problem of temporal qualia is. I offer a ‘reductionist’ account of temporal qualia that makes no reference to the concept of passage and argue that it is well motivated by empirical studies in motion perception.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Farr, Mattmail@mattfarr.co.uk0000-0001-6238-7990
Additional Information: Forthcoming in European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
Keywords: time; temporal passage; temporal experience; motion perception; cognitive illusions
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Depositing User: Dr Matt Farr
Date Deposited: 11 Sep 2019 16:02
Last Modified: 11 Sep 2019 16:02
Item ID: 16411
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Date: 2019
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16411

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