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Model Pluralism

Veit, Walter (2019) Model Pluralism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper introduces and defends an account of model-based science that I dub model pluralism. I argue that despite a growing awareness in the philosophy of science literature of the multiplicity, diversity, and richness of models and modeling-practices, more radical conclusions follow from this recognition than have previously been inferred. Going against the tendency within the literature to generalize from single models, I explicate and defend the following two core theses: (i) any successful analysis of models must target sets of models, their multiplicity of functions within science, and their scientific context and history and (ii) for almost any aspect x of phenomenon y, scientists require multiple models to achieve scientific goal z.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Veit, Walterwrwveit@gmail.com0000-0001-7701-8995
Keywords: modeling, models, model-based science, pluralism, idealization, methodology
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
General Issues > Computer Simulation
Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Rhetoric of Science
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User: Mr. Walter Veit
Date Deposited: 23 Sep 2019 01:39
Last Modified: 23 Sep 2019 01:39
Item ID: 16451
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
General Issues > Computer Simulation
Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Rhetoric of Science
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date: 2019
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16451

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