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Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective

Ross, Lauren N. (2019) Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective.

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Abstract

This paper examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings of this framework are found in an influential paper by Sober (1999), in which he argues that the multiple realizability thesis poses no challenge to reductive explanation. While Sober’s causal approach has the potential to reveal new insights, I argue that his set up fails to capture important aspects of the multiple realizability thesis. After correcting for these issues, I argue that this causal framework reveals something quite different. It reveals how multiple realizability relates to a common type of causal complexity in biology that poses problems for reductive explanation.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Ross, Lauren N.rossl@uci.edu0000-0003-0771-7189
Keywords: causation, multiple realizability, explanation, causal complexity, reduction
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User: Dr. Lauren N. Ross
Date Deposited: 03 Oct 2019 15:22
Last Modified: 03 Oct 2019 15:22
Item ID: 16476
Publisher: Philosophy of Science
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date: 1 October 2019
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16476

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