Broessel, Peter and Eder, Anna-Maria (2014) How to resolve doxastic disagreement. Synthese, 191 (11). pp. 2359-2381. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide an adequate answer to the question of how to rationally revise one’s epistemic state in the light of disagreement.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Broessel, Peter Eder, Anna-Maria
Keywords:	Disagreement, Probability Aggregation, Bayesian Epistemolgy
Depositing User:	Dr Peter Brössel
Date Deposited:	14 Oct 2019 03:50
Last Modified:	14 Oct 2019 03:50
Item ID:	16530
Journal or Publication Title:	Synthese
Publisher:	Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
Official URL:	https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-0...
Date:	2014
Page Range:	pp. 2359-2381
Volume:	191
Number:	11
ISSN:	1573-0964
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16530

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