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Induction: a formal perspective

Saint-Mont, Uwe (2019) Induction: a formal perspective. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The aim of this contribution is to provide a rather general answer to Hume's problem. To this end, induction is treated within a straightforward formal paradigm, i.e., several connected levels of abstraction.

Within this setting, many concrete models are discussed. On the one hand, models from mathematics, statistics and information science demonstrate how induction might succeed. On the other hand, standard examples from philosophy highlight fundamental difficulties.

Thus it transpires that the difference between unbounded and bounded inductive steps is crucial: While unbounded leaps of faith are never justi�ed, there may well be reasonable bounded inductive steps.

In this endeavour, the twin concepts of information and probability prove to be indispensable, pinning down the crucial arguments, and, at times, reducing them to
calculations.

Essentially, a precise study of boundedness settles Goodman's challenge. Hume's more profound claim of seemingly inevitable circularity is answered by obviously non-circular
hierarchical structures.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Saint-Mont, Uwesaint-mont@hs-nordhausen.de0000-0001-6801-3658
Keywords: Hume's Problem; Induction; Inference
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Prof. Uwe Saint-Mont
Date Deposited: 09 Dec 2019 05:51
Last Modified: 09 Dec 2019 05:51
Item ID: 16681
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 2 December 2019
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16681

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