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Resources and the acceptability of the Repugnant Conclusion

Schmidt, Stephen J. (2020) Resources and the acceptability of the Repugnant Conclusion. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 35 (1). pp. 113-128. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion argues, against intuition, that for any world A, another world Z with higher population and minimal well-being is better. That intuition is incorrect because the argument has not considered resources that support well-being. Z must have many more resources supporting well-being than A does. Z is repugnant because it spreads those resources among too many people; another world with Z’s resources and fewer people, if available, would be far superior. But Z is still better than A; it is worth accepting its very large population to get the resources needed to support their well-being.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Schmidt, Stephen J.schmidsj@union.edu
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Repugnant Conclusion, resources, feasibility, population ethics.
Subjects: General Issues > Ethical Issues
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Social Psychology
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 05 Mar 2020 01:31
Last Modified: 05 Mar 2020 01:31
Item ID: 16973
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: https://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.20121
Subjects: General Issues > Ethical Issues
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Social Psychology
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: January 2020
Page Range: pp. 113-128
Volume: 35
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16973

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