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Objectivity in contexts: Withholding epistemic judgement as a strategy for mitigating collective bias

Koskinen, Inkeri (2020) Objectivity in contexts: Withholding epistemic judgement as a strategy for mitigating collective bias. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper I discuss and develop the risk account of scientific objectivity, which I have recently introduced, contrasting it to some alternatives. I then use the account in order to analyse a practice that is relatively common in anthropology, in the history of science, and in the sociology of scientific knowledge: withholding epistemic judgement. I argue that withholding epistemic judgement on the beliefs one is studying can be a relatively efficient strategy against collective bias in these fields. However, taking into account the criticisms presented against the strategy, I also argue that it is a usable strategy only when the distance between the researchers and their ideas, and the people and ideas being studied, is significant enough.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Koskinen, Inkeriinkeri.koskinen@tuni.fi0000-0002-9060-7011
Keywords: scientific objectivity, epistemic risk, values in science, collective bias, objectivity in the social sciences, objectivity in the humanities
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Anthropology
Specific Sciences > Historical Sciences
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Sociology
Depositing User: Dr. Inkeri Koskinen
Date Deposited: 29 Mar 2020 03:52
Last Modified: 29 Mar 2020 03:52
Item ID: 17030
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Anthropology
Specific Sciences > Historical Sciences
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Sociology
Date: 2020
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17030

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