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Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference

Sprenger, Jan (2019) Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference. Philosophy of Science, 87 (2). pp. 319-335. ISSN 1539-767X

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Abstract

Why are conditional degrees of belief in an observation E, given a statistical hypothesis H, aligned with the objective probabilities expressed by H? After showing that standard replies (ratio analysis of conditional probability, chance-credence coordination) are not satisfactory, I develop a suppositional analysis of conditional degree of belief, transferring Ramsey’s classical proposal to statistical inference. The analysis saves the alignment, explains the role of chance-credence coordination, and rebuts the charge of arbitrary assessment of evidence in Bayesian inference. Finally, I explore the implications of this analysis for Bayesian reasoning with idealized models in science.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Sprenger, Janj.sprenger@uvt.nl0000-0003-0083-9685
Keywords: conditional probability, degree of belief, statistical inference, Principal Principle, Ramsey
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Jan Sprenger
Date Deposited: 13 May 2020 01:43
Last Modified: 13 May 2020 01:43
Item ID: 17174
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophy of Science
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Official URL: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1086/707554
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 1 July 2019
Page Range: pp. 319-335
Volume: 87
Number: 2
ISSN: 1539-767X
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17174

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