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Well-Being Coherentism

Hersch, Gil (2020) Well-Being Coherentism. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1464-3537

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Abstract

Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually prior to measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize well-being and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to well-being science.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Hersch, Gilhersch@vt.edu0000-0003-0992-0164
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > Ethical Issues
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Science and Policy
Depositing User: Dr. Gil Hersch
Date Deposited: 17 May 2020 06:49
Last Modified: 17 May 2020 06:49
Item ID: 17185
Journal or Publication Title: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > Ethical Issues
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Science and Policy
Date: 2020
ISSN: 1464-3537
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17185

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