Fischer, Enno (2020) Causation and the Problem of Disagreement. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Abstract
This paper presents a new argument for incorporating a distinction between default and deviant values into the formalism of causal models. The argument is based on considerations about how causal reasoners should represent disagreement over causes and it is defended against an objection that has been raised against earlier arguments for defaults.
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| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Causal Models Defaults Actual Causation | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Ethical Issues |
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| Depositing User: | Enno Fischer | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jun 2020 15:04 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 09 Jun 2020 15:04 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 17297 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Ethical Issues |
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| Date: | 2020 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17297 |
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