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Nash, bargaining and evolution

Bruner, Justin (2020) Nash, bargaining and evolution. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Evolutionary accounts of morality tend to consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. For instance, evolutionary work on fairness focuses on the division of a windfall and, importantly, assumes the position of those involved are entirely symmetric. We consider more complicated strategic settings and find that there is a strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with the so-called Nash bargaining solution. We also uncover the evolutionary importance of comprehensiveness, an often-overlooked feature of division problems.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Bruner, Justinjustinpbruner@gmail.com
Keywords: Game theory; evolution; evolutionary ethics
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Game Theory
Depositing User: Dr Justin Bruner
Date Deposited: 24 Jun 2020 01:54
Last Modified: 24 Jun 2020 01:54
Item ID: 17366
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Game Theory
Date: 2020
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17366

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