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A Fond Farewell to "Approximate Truth"?

Stanford, P. Kyle (2018) A Fond Farewell to "Approximate Truth"? Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 9 (1). pp. 78-81. ISSN 1913-0465

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Abstract

Most commonly, the scientific realism debate is seen as dividing those who do and do not think that the striking empirical and practical successes of at least our best scientific theories indicate with high probability that those theories are ‘approximately true’. But I want to suggest that this characterization of the debate has far outlived its usefulness. Not only does it obscure the central differences between two profoundly different types of contemporary scientific realist, but even more importantly it serves to disguise the most substantial points of actual disagreement between these two kinds of realists and those who instead think the historical record of scientific inquiry itself reveals that such realism is untenable in either form.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Stanford, P. Kyle
Keywords: Scientific Realism; Epistemic Issues; Epistemology of Science
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Technology
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Jordan Miller
Date Deposited: 01 Aug 2021 13:36
Last Modified: 01 Aug 2021 13:36
Item ID: 17826
Journal or Publication Title: Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science
Publisher: The University of Toronto
Official URL: https://spontaneousgenerations.library.utoronto.ca...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.4245/sponge.v9i1.28057
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Technology
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: 15 February 2018
Page Range: pp. 78-81
Volume: 9
Number: 1
ISSN: 1913-0465
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17826

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