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Incentivizing Replication is Insufficient to Safeguard Default Trust

Desmond, Hugh (2020) Incentivizing Replication is Insufficient to Safeguard Default Trust. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Philosophers of science and meta-scientists alike now typically model scientists’ behavior as driven by credit maximization. In this paper I argue that this modeling assumption cannot account for how scientists have a default level of trust in each other’s assertions. The normative implication of this is that science policy should not only focus on incentive reform.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Desmond, Hughhugh.desmond@uantwerpen.be0000-0002-4822-923X
Keywords: Replication Crisis; Scientific Methodology; Social Structure of Science; Incentives; Trust
Subjects: General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Science and Policy
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Prof. Dr. Hugh Desmond
Date Deposited: 18 Oct 2020 02:45
Last Modified: 18 Oct 2020 02:45
Item ID: 18260
Subjects: General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Science and Policy
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: March 2020
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18260

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