Lutz, Sebastian (2020) Two Constants in Carnap’s View on Scientific Theories. [Preprint]
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Abstract
The received view on the development of the correspondence rules in Carnap’s philosophy of science is that at first, Carnap assumed the explicit definability of all theoretical terms in observational terms and later weakened this assumption. In the end, he conjectured that all observational terms can be explicitly defined in in theoretical terms, but not vice versa. I argue that from the very beginning, Carnap implicitly held this last view, albeit at times in contradiction to his professed position. To establish this point I argue that, first, Carnap’s ‘Über die Aufgabe der Physik’ is a contribution to the philosophy of science of logical empiricism, contrary to Thomas Mormann and in agreement with Herbert Feigl. Second, Michael Friedman misunderstands the ‘Aufgabe’ with his claim that it describes a method for arriving at explicit definitions for theoretical terms.
Another received view on Carnap’s philosophy of science is that it assumed a formalization of physical theories that was too detached from actual physics and thus justly disavowed in favor of the semantic view as, for example, developed by van Fraassen. But the ‘Aufgabe’ and related works including the Aufbau show that from the very beginning to his last works, Carnap suggested formalizing physical theories as restrictions in mathematical spaces, as in the state-space conception of scientific theories favored by van Fraassen.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Rudolf Carnap; logical empiricism; logical positivism; received view; theory structure; correspondence rules; theoretical terms; Bas van Fraassen; constructive empiricism; state-space; phase space | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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| Depositing User: | Sebastian Lutz | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 29 Oct 2020 01:05 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 29 Oct 2020 01:05 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 18325 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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| Date: | 25 October 2020 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18325 |
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