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Do We See facts?

Vernazzani, Alfredo (2020) Do We See facts? [Preprint]

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Abstract

Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology and epistemology of visual perception.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Vernazzani, Alfredo
Keywords: Facts; Seeing; Sensory Individuals; Metaphysics of Perception; Object Perception; Binding Problem; Perceptual Content
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Dr. Alfredo Vernazzani
Date Deposited: 13 Nov 2020 04:52
Last Modified: 13 Nov 2020 04:52
Item ID: 18383
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1111/mila.12336
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 2020
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18383

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