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Applying Perspectival Realism to Frequentist Statistics: The Case of Jerzy Neyman’s Methodology and Philosophy

Kubiak, Adam P. (2021) Applying Perspectival Realism to Frequentist Statistics: The Case of Jerzy Neyman’s Methodology and Philosophy. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

I investigate the extent to which perspectival realism (PR) agrees with frequentist statistical methodology and philosophy, with an emphasis on J. Neyman’s views. Based on the example of the stopping rule problem I argue that PR can naturally be associated with frequentist statistics. Then I analyze Neyman’s conception of statistical inference to conclude that PR and Neyman’s conception are incongruent. Additionally, I show that Neyman’s philosophy is internally inconsistent. I conclude that Neyman’s frequentism weakens the philosophical validity and universality of PR as analyzed from the point of view of statistical methodology.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Kubiak, Adam P.adampkubiak@gmail.com0000-0001-7178-3784
Keywords: statistics frequentism realism perspectivism pragmatism
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Experimentation
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Adam Kubiak
Date Deposited: 04 Apr 2021 13:13
Last Modified: 04 Apr 2021 13:13
Item ID: 18886
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Experimentation
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2 April 2021
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18886

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