Reutlinger, Alexander (2021) Objectivity as Independence. Episteme.

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Abstract

Building on Nozick's invariantism about objectivity, I propose to define scientific objectivity in terms of counterfactual independence. I will argue that such a counterfactual independence account is (a) able to overcome the decisive shortcomings of Nozick's original invariantism and (b) applicable to three paradigmatic kinds of scientific objectivity (that is, objectivity as replication, objectivity as robustness, and objectivity as Mertonian universalism).

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Reutlinger, Alexander Alexander.Reutlinger@lrz.uni-muenchen.de 0000-0001-7638-6059
Keywords:	scientific objectivity; invariance; counterfactual dependence; independence; evidence; confirmation; replication; robustness; universalism; ethos of science
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Feminist Approaches General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Science Education General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Alexander Reutlinger
Date Deposited:	25 Apr 2021 03:56
Last Modified:	25 Apr 2021 03:56
Item ID:	18944
Journal or Publication Title:	Episteme
Official URL:	https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2021.5
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Feminist Approaches General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Science Education General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	2021
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18944

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