Huber, Franz (2004) Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? [Preprint]

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Abstract

Bayesianism is the position that scientific reasoning is probabilistic and that probabilities are adequately interpreted as an agent’s actual subjective degrees of belief, measured by her betting behaviour. Confirmation is one important aspect of scientific reasoning. The thesis of this paper is the following: If scientific reasoning is at all probabilistic, the subjective interpretation has to be given up in order to get right confirmation – and thus scientific reasoning in general.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Huber, Franz
Additional Information:	subjective probability, confirmation, Bayesianism, old evidence
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User:	Franz Huber
Date Deposited:	04 Sep 2004
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:12
Item ID:	1941
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date:	September 2004
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1941

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