Elkin, Lee (2021) The Precautionary Principle and Expert Disagreement. Erkenntnis. ISSN 0165-0106
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Abstract
The Precautionary Principle is typically construed as a conservative decision rule aimed at preventing harm. But Martin Peterson (JME 33: 5–10, 2007; The ethics of technology: A geometric analysis of five moral principles, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) has argued that the principle is better understood as an epistemic rule, guiding decision-makers in forming beliefs rather than choosing among possible acts. On the epistemic view, he claims there is a principle concerning expert disagreement underlying precautionary-based reasoning called the ecumenical principle: all expert views should be considered in a precautionary appraisal, not just those that are the most prominent or influential. In articulating the doxastic commitments of decision-makers under this constraint, Peterson precludes any probabilistic rule that might result in combining expert opinions. For combined or consensus prob- abilities are likely to provide decision-makers with information that is more precise than warranted. Contra Peterson, I argue that upon adopting a broader conception of probability, there is a probabilistic rule, under which expert opinions are combined, that is immune to his criticism and better represents the ecumenical principle.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Keywords: | precautionary principle, expert disagreement, imprecise probability | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Lee Elkin | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 21 Sep 2021 03:06 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 21 Sep 2021 03:06 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 19603 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Erkenntnis | ||||||
| Publisher: | Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.) | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00457-y | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science |
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| Date: | September 2021 | ||||||
| ISSN: | 0165-0106 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19603 |
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