Fleisher, Will and Šešelja, Dunja (2021) Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation
and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the collective action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks’ (2019) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the Epistemic Duty to Join Forces. Our theory provides an account of the responsibilities of scientists to prevent epistemic harms
during inquiry.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Fleisher, Will fleishwp@gmail.com Šešelja, Dunja d.seselja@tue.nl 0000-0001-5679-5787
Keywords:	epistemic harm, collective responsibility, epistemic responsibility, duty to join forces, norms of inquiry
Subjects:	General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Dr. Dunja Šešelja
Date Deposited:	24 Jan 2022 00:41
Last Modified:	24 Jan 2022 00:41
Item ID:	20104
Subjects:	General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	2021
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20104

Available Versions of this Item

• Collective Epistemic Responsibility: a Preventionist Account. (deposited 14 Mar 2020 17:23)

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