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The Veritistic Merit of Doxastic Conservatism in Belief Revision

Betz, Gregor (2016) The Veritistic Merit of Doxastic Conservatism in Belief Revision. [Preprint]

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Abstract

There are different varieties of conservatism concerning belief formation and revision. We assesses the veritistic effects of a particular kind of conservatism commonly attributed to Quine: the so-called maxim of minimum mutiliation, which states that agents should give up as few beliefs as possible when facing recalcitrant evidence. Based on a formal bounded rationality model of belief revision, which parametrizes degree of conservatism, and corresponding multi-agent simulations, we eventually argue against doxastic conservatism from the vantage point of veritistic social epistemology.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Betz, Gregorgregor.betz@kit.edu0000-0001-5802-5030
Keywords: Doxastic conservatism; Epistemic conservatism; Verificationism; Maxim of minimum mutilation; Degree of justification; Belief revision; Bounded rationality; Veritistic value; Argumentation; Dialectical structure
Subjects: General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User: Gregor Betz
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2022 14:14
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2022 14:14
Item ID: 20111
Subjects: General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date: May 2016
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20111

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