PhilSci Archive

Causation Comes in Degrees

Demirtas, Huzeyfe (2021) Causation Comes in Degrees. [Preprint]

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
Text
Demirtas - Causation Comes in Degrees.pdf

Download (852kB) | Preview

Abstract

Which country, politician, or policy is more of a cause of the Covid-19 pandemic death toll? Which of the two factories causally contributed more to the pollution of the nearby river? A wide-ranging portion of our everyday thought and talk, and attitudes rely on a graded notion of causation. However, it is sometimes highlighted that on most contemporary accounts, causation is on-off. Some philosophers further question the legitimacy of talk of degrees of causation and suggest that we avoid it. Some hold that the notion of degrees of causation is an illusion. In this paper, I’ll argue that causation does come in degrees.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Demirtas, Huzeyfehdemirta@syr.edu0000-0001-8197-5579
Keywords: Degrees of causation, more of a cause, causal contribution, causal responsibility, moral responsibility
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Depositing User: Huzeyfe Demirtas
Date Deposited: 03 Mar 2022 17:48
Last Modified: 03 Mar 2022 17:48
Item ID: 20290
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Date: 2021
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20290

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item