PhilSci Archive

Scientists are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination

Stuart, Michael T. (2022) Scientists are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
Scientists are Epistemic Consequentialists.pdf

Download (172kB) | Preview

Abstract

Scientists imagine, and their imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that present different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally consequentialists about imagination.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Stuart, Michael T.mike.stuart.post@gmail.com0000-0002-4165-2641
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science
Keywords: imagination; scientific imagination; epistemology; philosophy of science; consequentialism; deontology; virtue epistemology; social science of science
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
Specific Sciences > Climate Science and Meteorology
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Michael T. Stuart
Date Deposited: 29 Apr 2022 03:48
Last Modified: 29 Apr 2022 03:48
Item ID: 20524
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
Specific Sciences > Climate Science and Meteorology
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 2022
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20524

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item