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The Bearable Thinness of Being: A Pragmatist Metaphysics of Affordances

Mitchell, Sandra D. (2022) The Bearable Thinness of Being: A Pragmatist Metaphysics of Affordances. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Taking a pragmatist stance toward the practices and products of science shapes our answers to central philosophical questions. In argue that from within a perspective consisting of goals, actions and questions, what we say there is and what we say it does, is justified by the ongoing interactions among representative models, causal experience and experiment, and conceptual frameworks in reaching a fallible convergence to what is real. I offer a non-dichotomous alternative. I propose an alternative to fundamentalist approaches, arguing that what we are justified in claiming as real phenomena are the affordances constructed from the integration of top-down and bottom-up strategies.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Mitchell, Sandra D.smitchel@pitt.edu
Additional Information: This is a draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the forthcoming book The Pragmatist Challenge: Pragmatist Metaphysics for Philosophy of Science edited by H. K. Andersen and Sandra D. Mitchell due for publication in 2023.
Keywords: pragmatism, realism, metaphysics, experimentation, affordance, perspectivism
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Sandra D. Mitchell
Date Deposited: 05 Aug 2022 21:46
Last Modified: 05 Aug 2022 21:46
Item ID: 21024
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: July 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21024

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