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The Epistemological Root of the Problem of Induction

Badino, Massimiliano (2004) The Epistemological Root of the Problem of Induction. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    This paper analyzes the epistemological significance of the problem of induction. In the first section, the foundation of this problem is identified in the thesis of gnoseological dualism: we only know our representations as separate from ‘the world itself’. This thesis will be countered by the thesis of gnoseological monism. In the second section, the implications of Hume’s skeptical thesis will be highlighted and it will be demonstrated how the point of view of gnoseological monism can offer a way out that I call the hermeneutic theory of induction. In the third section, a formal approach is proposed in agreement with this theory. Using tools of the theory of information, this defines the conditions of acceptance or refusal of a hypothesis starting with an experiment. In the fourth section, the epistemological consequences of this approach are analyzed.


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    Item Type: Other
    Additional Information: Submitted for publication to Erkenntnis
    Keywords: Induction, epistemology, information
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Depositing User: Dr. Massimiliano Badino
    Date Deposited: 13 Dec 2004
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:13
    Item ID: 2115
    Public Domain: No
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2115

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