PhilSci Archive

Perspectival Realism and Frequentist Statistics: The Case of Jerzy Neyman’s Methodology and Philosophy

Kubiak, Adam P. (2022) Perspectival Realism and Frequentist Statistics: The Case of Jerzy Neyman’s Methodology and Philosophy. In: UNSPECIFIED.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
Text
Perspectival Realism and Frequentist Statistics 13_09_2022.pdf

Download (984kB) | Preview

Abstract

I investigate the extent to which perspectival realism (PR) agrees with frequentist statistical methodology and philosophy, with an emphasis on J. Neyman’s views. Based on the example of the stopping rule problem, I show how PR can naturally be associated with frequentist statistics in general. I also show that there are some aspects of Neyman’s thought that seem to confirm PR and others that disconfirm it. I argue that epistemic PR is consistent with Neyman’s frequentism to a satisfactory degree and that on the grounds of Neyman’s frequentist methodology one is dealing with genuine and non-trivial perspectives. I also argue that universality and normativity of PR are weakened when analysed from the point of view of Neyman’s statistical methodology.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Kubiak, Adam P.adampkubiak@gmail.com0000-0001-7178-3784
Keywords: statistics frequentism scientific realism scientific perspective models philosophy of science
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Experimentation
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Adam Kubiak
Date Deposited: 14 Sep 2022 14:46
Last Modified: 14 Sep 2022 14:46
Item ID: 21160
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Experimentation
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 14 September 2022
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21160

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item