PhilSci Archive

Accuracy, Probabilism, and the Insufficiency of the Alethic

Dethier, Corey (2022) Accuracy, Probabilism, and the Insufficiency of the Alethic. Philosophical Studies, 179. pp. 2285-2301. ISSN 0031-8116

This is the latest version of this item.


Download (309kB) | Preview


The best and most popular argument for probabilism is the accuracy-dominance argument, which purports to show that alethic considerations alone support the view that an agent's degrees of belief should always obey the axioms of probability. I argue that extant versions of the accuracy-dominance argument face a problem. In order for the mathematics of the argument to function as advertised, we must assume that every omniscient credence function is classically consistent; there can be no worlds in the set of dominance-relevant worlds that obey some other logic. This restriction cannot be motivated on alethic grounds unless we're also willing to accept that rationality requires belief in every metaphysical necessity, as the distinction between a priori logical necessities and a posteriori metaphysical ones is not an alethic distinction. To justify the restriction to classically consistent worlds, non-alethic motivation is required. And thus, if there is a version of the accuracy-dominance argument in support of probabilism, it isn't one that is grounded in alethic considerations alone.

Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Dethier, Coreycorey.dethier@gmail.com0000-0002-1240-8391
Keywords: Probabilism, Accuracy, Accuracy-First Epistemology, Epistemic Utility Theory, Veritism
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
Depositing User: Dr. Corey Dethier
Date Deposited: 15 Nov 2022 18:53
Last Modified: 15 Nov 2022 18:53
Item ID: 21421
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophical Studies
Publisher: Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
DOI or Unique Handle:
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
Date: 2022
Page Range: pp. 2285-2301
Volume: 179
ISSN: 0031-8116

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item