Hoyningen-Huene, Paul
(2023)
Objectivity, Value-Free Science, and Inductive Risk.
[Preprint]
Abstract
In this paper I shall defend the idea that there is an abstract and general core meaning of objectivity, and what is seen as a variety of concepts or conceptions of objectivity are in fact criteria of, or means to achieve, objectivity. I shall then discuss the ideal of value-free science and its relation to the objec-tivity of science; its status can be at best a criterion of, or means for, objectivity. Given this analysis, we can then turn to the problem of inductive risk. Do the value judgements regarding inductive risk really pose a threat to the objectivity of science? I claim that this is not the case because they do not lower the thresholds scientifically postulated for objectivity. I shall conclude the paper with a discus-sion of under-appreciated influences of values on science, which indeed pose a serious threat to the objectivity of some scientific disciplines.
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