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The Evolution of the Bell Notion of Beable: from Bohr to Primitive Ontology

Laudisa, Federico (2023) The Evolution of the Bell Notion of Beable: from Bohr to Primitive Ontology. [Preprint]

LAUDISA, Evolution of the Bell notion of beable.pdf

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John S. Bell introduced the notion of beable, as opposed to the standard notion of observable, in order to emphasize the need for an unambiguous formulation of quantum mechanics. In the paper I show that Bell formulated in fact two different theories of beables. The first is somehow reminiscent of the Bohr views on quantum mechanics but, at the same time, is curiously adopted by Bell as a critical tool against the Copenhagen interpretation, whereas the second, more mature formulation was among the sources of inspiration of the so-called Primitive Ontology (PO) approach to quantum mechanics, an approach inspired to scientific realism. In the first part of the paper it is argued that, contrary to the Bell wishes, the first formulation of the theory fails to be an effective recipe for addressing the ambiguity underlying the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, whereas it is only the second formulation that successfully paves the way to the PO approach. In the second part, I consider how the distinction between the two formulations of the Bell theory of beables fares vis-a-vis the complex relationship between the theory of beables and the details of the PO approach.

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Item Type: Preprint
Keywords: John S. Bell; theory of beables; Niels Bohr; primitive ontology
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User: Prof. Federico Laudisa
Date Deposited: 26 May 2023 19:47
Last Modified: 26 May 2023 19:47
Item ID: 22147
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Date: May 2023

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