Rubin, Mark (2023) The replication crisis is less of a “crisis” in the Lakatosian approach than it is in the Popperian and naïve methodological falsificationism approaches. [Preprint]

Preview

Text Popper, Lakatos, NMF, & the Replication Crisis.pdf - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (359kB) | Preview

Abstract

Popper’s (1983, 2002) philosophy of science has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the wake of the replication crisis, offering a philosophical basis for the ensuing science reform movement. However, adherence to Popper’s approach may also be at least partly responsible for the sense of “crisis” that has developed following multiple unexpected replication failures. In this article, I contrast Popper’s approach with Lakatos’ (1978) approach and a related approach called naïve methodological falsificationism (NMF; Lakatos, 1978). The Popperian approach is powerful because it is based on logical refutation, but its theories are noncausal and, therefore, lacking in scientific value. In contrast, the Lakatosian approach tests causal theories, but it concedes that these theories are not logically refutable. Finally, the NMF approach subjects Lakatosian causal theories to Popperian logical refutations. However, its approach of temporarily accepting a ceteris paribus clause during theory testing may be viewed as scientifically inappropriate, epistemically inconsistent, and “completely redundant” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 40). I conclude that a replication “crisis” makes the most sense in the context of the Popperian and NMF approaches because it is only in these two approaches that replication failures represent logical refutations of theories. In contrast, replication failures are less problematic in the Lakatosian approach because they do not logically refute theories. Indeed, in the Lakatosian approach, replication failures can be legitimately ignored or used to motivate theory development.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Rubin, Mark Mark-Rubin@outlook.com 0000-0002-6483-8561
Keywords:	metascience; Popper; Lakatos; replication crisis
Subjects:	General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Dr Mark Rubin
Date Deposited:	30 Aug 2023 07:47
Last Modified:	30 Aug 2023 07:47
Item ID:	22466
Official URL:	https://doi.org/10.31222/osf.io/2dz9s
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.31222/osf.io/2dz9s
Subjects:	General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	27 August 2023
URI:	http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22466

Available Versions of this Item

• The replication crisis is less of a “crisis” in the Lakatosian approach than it is in the Popperian and naïve methodological falsificationism approaches. (deposited 30 Aug 2023 07:47) [Currently Displayed]
  • Popper, Lakatos, NMF, and the Replication Crisis. (deposited 08 Sep 2023 20:38)
    • Popper, Lakatos, NMF, and the Replication Crisis. (deposited 11 Sep 2023 20:27)

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Altmetric.com

Actions (login required)

View Item